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There have been significant financial sector refqrms through the 1990s. Olie  of the major
policy changes affecting the financial markets has been reduction in government’s recourse
to claims  on  Ioanable  funds through statutory liquidity ratio as well as high levels  of  Cash
Reserve Ratios. The central government has switched to market borrowing  tp finance its
fiscal deficit on a larger scale than before. There is a general move towards market
determined rates and flows in’ the financial sector. One area where administered rates are
still important is the small saving instruments. The government sets these interest rates and
mob&es funds  for  meeting the  fiscal  deficits at the  centrk and more so at the state level.  If
these rates  were,to  be determined by the markets, ivhat would  happen  to the interest rates in
general. One argument’ is  that’the  small saving rates act as a  floor to the deposit rates  of
the banking sector and hence also determine the lending. rates.,  If  the overall balance  of
demand and supply  of  loanable  funds is such that interest  rat&  can be lower, the small
saving  rates.do  not  let that emerge,  @rt@r,  as. interest rates  de&n&  there would be ’
significant  gains  in economic growth. This. paper i’s an attempt to examine this viewpoint.  ‘.
We .+ velop  a monetarist model of the economy and assess the implications of alternative
metv   4s  of  financing the fiscal deficit  of  the government, central and states combined. The
results support the view that overall interest rates  worild  decline  if  the small saving rates
were to be  LberaIised  but the gains in economic  .growth  would  hot  be dramatic. . . .




he 1990s saw major institutional
reforms in the Indian financial
sector. The stock markets. commer-
cial banks, non-banking financial institu-
tions, insurance companies all saw phases
of major restructuring and reforms. One
underlying expectation of these reforms
was to provide Indian enterprises access
to funds at globally competitive interest
rates or cost. While the nominal interest
rates have declined, real interest rates have
remained high during the decade. Figure 1
shows that real interest rates, using con-
sumer price index for industrial workers
as a measure of prices, have in fact been
higher for the period from mid-1998
onwards as compared to the period from
1993-93 to 1997-98.  Explanation for high
real interest rates has varied from the large
fiscaldeficit  to the remaining vestiges of the
administered interest rate  regime  reflected
in the interest rate on small savings (SS).
Mohan (2000) argues thit  the necessity of
financing high fiscal deficits forces the  RBI
to impose high reserve ratios on bank depo-
sits, which in turn makes it necessary for
banks to have higher lending rates. Patnaik
(2000.2001) suggests that for a given money
supply a fiscal deficit can raise the interest
rate by raising the demand for money, but
this linkage would beeffectivconly  ifbank
credit is supply-constrained. He also justi-
fies the high real interest rates prevailing
in India on the grounds that investment in
third world countries is exposed to higher
risk relative to developed countries; there-
fore the real rate of  return  has to be cor-
respondingly higher in  order  to attract and
retain international capital.
One of the more  extreme  positions in the
current debate has been put forward  by
SurjitBhalla.Inaseriesofpakrsand  news-
paper articles, he has afgued  for liberal-
isation of interest rate regime. Two of his
papers [Bhalla  2000 and Oxus  Research
and Investments  2OOO]  provide the  fullest
statement of his position. The arguments
can be summarised  in terms of five key
points. First. Indian interest rates -despite
officialdisclaimers-areadministeredrates .
where a floor is set by the administered
nominal rates on SS - mainly postal sav-
ings deposits - and provident fund (PF)
schemes. The nominal interest rate on these
from 1985 was 12 per cent, and despite
declining inflation in the 1990s. these rates
were kept fixed  till February 1999.  when
the SS interest rates were reduced to 11.5
per cent and in January 2000 the interest
rate on both SS and  PFschemes  was reduced
to 11 per cent with the 200 1 Budget further
reducing it to 9.5 per cent.
Nevertheless. the real interest rates havercnl;linctl  high.  As  AI\   illuslration.  Inking
tl15   11om11x1l   SS   and   1‘1:   rntcs  ns  the   lloor
(at  9.5   per  cent),  c~rrcnt   inllation rntc of
3.5 lxr cent and the  g;~p  hctwccn deposit
;Ind   Icnding   rates  of 3 pcrccntagc points,
[hc rc3l  intcrcst  rate  works  Out   10  9 per cent
per year as compared to 8 per  cent  in 1995.
The  spread   between  SS rates  and the prime
lending   rates  (PLR) of  the  commercial
banks  varies  from  200  to 400 basis points
toda);  implying real  interest  rates  of I1 to
I3 per cent  for the  best  customers of the
banks.  They  arc among the highest real
interest rates in the  world..If  the govern2
ment  tiere  to  free  interest rates, then based
on the experience of other developing
countries [Bhalla  19951, the real interest
rate on IO-year government paper should
decline to 5 per  cent.’  This in turn, based
on estimates made in  Bhalla(  1999). should
raise the real GDP growth rate from the
current  6 per cent to 9 per  ctint  per annum.
Secondly, Bhalla argues that, because of
the floor on interest rates, the normal
causation from high fiscal deficits to high
interest rates does not apply in India. Most
macro-relationships have been non-exis;
tent in India  over  the  lash  20 years, as most
of the key macro variables, like the growth
rate of the money supply and the fiscal’
deficit ti a pr?pottion  of GDP have been
constants. As such, he  arguqs,  the causa-
tion runs from’ high interest rates to high
fiscal  deticits   a?d  hence reducing the latter
involves reducing the former by reducing
the administered rates on SS and PF which
set the floor for the rates at which the
government can currently borrow.
Third, and the most original and con-
vincing part of his thesis is that the states
which receive 75 per cent of the savings
depositscollectedare currently using these
funds to finance about a third of their
.deficits  (which were about 5 per cent of
GDP in 1999-2000) in a pyramid (Ponzi)
scheme, whereby the deposits collected in
any year are immediately used to finance
the states’ deficits. Next year the new
deposits are used to finance new  expen-
,diture. Thus, from financing 10 per cent
of the states’ deficits in 1985, by 1999 they
were financing 32 per cent. As this is a
non-transparent Ponzi scheme, state poli-
ticians find the opportunity cost of these
funds to them is nearly zero as they do not
have to explain to their electorates what
they have done with the borrowings.
Fourth, he, therefore, concludes that
attempts to control the fiscal deficit di-
rectly are misguided, that the rates on SS
and  PF should be freed and that all public
Flguro  1:  Real   lntorcsl  Ralos
20.0  -  .--., -  -.-._..-.----  ---  -.  __,__..   _   _. - . _. .
15.0
10.0  -
-SBl’s  Prime Lending Rate -  -’ -  -IDBl’s  Prime Lending Rate
Figure 2: Flnanclal Repression .
i’  =  r*
interest Rate .  i
iL-p=rL  - - - - --
Supply and Demand for  Loanable’Funds
borrowing should be done at market de-
termined interest rates with the states
funding their deficits transparently by
issuing their own bonds.
Finally, Bhalla recommends that the  RI31
should be granted  indepcndcnce  to con-
duct monetary policy.
In this paper we  propose  to: (a) set these
arguments in 3 framework which is the
exact oppositeof the well known ‘financial
repression’ model of Mckinnon. which is
Iabelled’financialexuberance’(Section  II):
(b) examine the arguments within an an-
alytical framework from Lal(l995)  which
distinguishes between different theories of
the macro-economy  -the  ‘monetarist’, the
‘new classical’  and   the   ‘Wicksellian’
(Section III),’ and (cj to provide some
empirical validation for what appears   to
be the applicability  of  the monetarist
model in India. and to show how the Bhalla
‘facts’ can be accommod&l  within it
(Section IV.  This allows  US  to show that
some of the Bhalla policy conclusions are




Consider the well known model of finan-
cial repression due to Mckinnon, which is
depicted in Figure 2. Assume that the
government finances its  fisc31  deficit purely
through the inflation t3x.  Let us also as-
sume that bank deposits are the only finan-
cial assets held by the households. If DT is
the demand for time deposits at real de-
posit rates rd.  which.given  an equilibrium
inflation rate of p implies a nominal de-
posit rate id , with rd = id-p. If the bank
reserve ratio is k, then the supply of  loan-
able funds is given by the SL schedule that
is by (l-k) DT.
The demand for loans (from the private
sector,  as  the government is printing moneyFigure  3: Financial Exuboranco
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For a given fiscal  deficit. lhc  required
rcvcnuc from the inflation tax  implies  an
equilibrium  inflation ram  p, which in turn
will imply a divergcncc  in the real  lending
(rl) and deposit (rd)  rates. At  the real deposit
rate ‘rd’, there will be  OR  of  time  deposits
of which ‘bc’ will  have  to be  held  as
reserves leaving OL to be  lent  out to the
rA
b
private sector at the equilibrium real lend-
ing rate rl. The gap ‘ab’ between  rl and
rd provides a measure of the revenue from
theinflation  tax.Thelargerthefiscaldeficit
the higher the equilibrium inflation rate  p,
and hence the wedge ‘ab’ between  rl and rd.
Compared with the position without a
. fiscal deficit  - when the equilibrium real
loan and deposit rates will be equal at  r*
with  OD’of time deposits, L’D’of  reserves
and OL’ of loans to the private sector  -
There  is crowding out of private investment
of  ‘ef’. Also, the size of the time deposits
is  lowerby   DD’and  of loans by LL’. Hence
this is a financially repressed economy.
Now, considerthe case where the fiscal
deficit is financed entirely through public
borrowing at a real interest rate (given by
the administered rates on SS and PF funds)
which provides a floor to the real interest
rate ‘above the equilibrium interest rate.
This is depicted in Figure 3. A S before, DT
is the demand for time deposits (of which
/’  1 Supply and Demand for Loanable  Funds
If this model is applicable to India. and  *  ,Thus  let  M  be base or reserve money,
‘ab’ constitute  SS  and PF deposits), SL is
the supply of  loanable  funds for the given
reserve ratio k, and DL is the demand for
loans from the private sector. The equi-
librium at the administered interest rate
fi implies a demand for time deposits of
OD,  of which RD are held  as reserves and
are available to fund the consolidated
(central and states) fiscal deficit, and LR
the share of the savings deposits accruing
to the government (in particular the states)
. to fund the fiscal deficit, leaving OL as
the  loanable  funds available to the private
sector.
the Bhalla conjecture encompassed within
it is true, then the government has found
a canny  .way of funding the budget deficit
in a non-inflationary way. However,
whether this is done  within  the limits set
by the’ overall long run-sustainability
condition  .for bond financing will be
discussed in the  next  ‘section.
This would also.explain  why the stan-
dard macro relationships concerning the
‘effects of the fiscal deficit on inflation do
noi  hold in India. But there would still be
crowding out of private investment of ‘hg’
- as compared with the case where there
is no fiscal deficit.3Moreovcr.  in this model,
there is an over mobilisntion of time
deposits (as compared with the no deficit
case) of D’ D.  So  as compared with the
Mckinnon model of ‘financial repression’,
this model Should be  labelled  as one of
tinancial  exuberance!
As. ex  hypothesi,  the whole of the con-
solidated fiscal deficit is funded by bor-
rowing from time deposits, clearly there
will be no inflationary impact of the fiscal
deficit, unless as  onthe ‘new classical’
view the public realises that bond finan-
cing of the deficit is unsustainable and will
mean that at some future date the  govem-
ment will have to levy the inflation tax to
meet its debt obligations. The inflationary
expectations assumed on this view seem
unrealistic for India.
A Framework for Analysing
the Macro-Economy
In India clearly there is  intlation,  so the
pure bond financing of fiscal deficits of
the ‘financial exuberance’  model   will  not
be strictly applicable. What we need is a
model, which combines bond and  money
financing ofdeficits. A general  fmmework
used in  La1  (1995) within which  altema-
tive views about the inflationary process
can be subsumed is helpful.
B(t) the stock of nominal interest bearing
government debt at date  t, which has a
r(t) real interest rate, .
where r(t)‘= i(t)-P(t),
with
i (t) the nominal interest rate, and
p (1)  the inflation , so if
P (t) is the price level p=(dP/dt)/(l/P)J
Y (t) is nominal GDP, whose growth rate
y is  (dY/dt)/(lN)  and
g is the growth rate of real GDP= y-p.
,The  demand for money is given by,
(dM/dt)(l/M)  = al-a2pe(t) + o3g(t)  . ..(l)
so demand for real base money depends
inversely upon the expected rate of infla-
tion and positively on the growth rate of
real GDP. If there are rational expecm-
tions, expected inflation  pe(t)  will equal
actual inflation P.-i  e, pe(t)=  p(t).
Second, there is the government’s bud-
get. constraint. If D is the nominal non-
interest or primary deficit. then in nominal
terms the constraint is:
PSBR=  D +  iB  = dM/dt  +  dB/dt  .  ..(2)
that is, the total government deficit (public
sector borrowing requirement or PSBR)
which includes the interest payments on
the government debt will have to be  linan-
ted  by some combination of increased
base money (yielding the inflation tax
revenue) and/or bond sales.
Broadly, three competing frameworks for
explaining the inflationary process can be
identified&al   1995j.Weconcentrare  on the
monetarist explanation  as the new classical
.nrld  \Vickscllinn   frmilcwOrkS   d0   no1  SCCIII
npplicnblc   to   India.  The ‘new  clsssicai
bceause  its assumption  about  inflationary
cxpcctationsdonotsccmvslid  forIndia(sce
previous section) and the  ‘Wicksellian’
bccausc  it assumes  that thcrc  is no non-
interest bearing  money   x  through  the   inter-
mediation  of the  banking system. all the
, interest bearing debt of the government is
‘money’ - which is again invalid for India.
Within the monetarist framework, the
government tinanccs  the primary deficit
(D) by increased base money (D= dM/dt)
and rolls over interest on its debt by issuing
new bonds (iB= dB/dt).  Hence inflation
is determined by the increase in base money
which in turn is determined by the primary
deficit  D,s  that is,  s   .:
p =  (dM/dt)(   l/M)  = D/M . ..(3)
The financing of the interest payments
by rolling over debt has no effect on the
inflation rate. For assuming that (as in the
financial exuberance model) all deficits
are bond financed so that  dM/dt   =O. and
defining
b = B/Y, the debt-income ratio
d  = D/Y, the  primary  deficit-income ratio,
and noting that,
b’  = d(BN)/dt = (dB/dt)(lN)  -
(dY/dt)   (lN)(BN) .
=  (dB/dt)(lN)  -yb
=  (d&dt)(lN)  i  (g+p)b  ..i(4)
Then in (2) with dM/dt  = 0, dividing
through by  Y, and substituting ‘for
(dB/dt) (l/Y)  from, (4) we have
d +ib = b’ +  (g +p)b,...(2n)
Dividing .through  by b and noting that
r = i-p, we get
b’/b  = (d/b) + (r-g)‘...(2b),
as the government’s budget constmint.‘,
For sustainable debt financing, the  debt-
income ratio must stabilise at a future date,
that is,
b’  = 0, and hence there will have to be a
long ‘run budget surplus (-d) of.
-d = (r-g)b . ..(S)
Thus, on the monetarist analysis there
need be no inflationary consequences of
the internal debt of government if the
primary deficit is converted into the long
run surplus given by (5) which stabilises
the debt-income ratio, and the growth of
the monetary base (dM/dt)  which deter-
mines the inflation rate (p) is limited to
the  growth of the real economy  (8).  This
would, given a near unit income elasticity
of demand for money, yield a stable price
level. The other components of the model,
namely, the demand and supply of  loan-
able funds or deposits are presented in the
next section.
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Clearly, the ‘financial exuberance’ model
(which  incorporates,the  Bhallaconjectun)
is encompassed by the  above  monetarist
model  05 it allows for  determinntion  of
an equilibrium, interest rate needed to
finunce’the fiscal deficit  and hence to





Next, we estimate this monetarist model
for India, to see if the Indian authorities
have implicitly been’ following this model.
We  fust  estimated the ‘financial exubennce’
model given by Figure 3, which covers  the
bond-financed part of the gross fiscal deficit
(PSBR). This was done in two steps:
First.the  DT and DL schedules, were
estimated as a function of the nominal
interest  rate..This  was because the infla-
tion rate relevant for determining the real
deposit rate which determines the demand
for time deposits is likely to be the con-
sumer price index  (01)  while that for the
privatedemand  forloanable.funds  is likely
to be the wholesale price index (WPI). As,
ex hypothesi. the whole of the non-primary
deficit is financed by borrowing, on
which despite the differing interest rates
paid on different parts of government
borrowing, the marginal rate on com-
parable maturity government debt is
likely to be set by the postulated  floor
Loans raised
given byXhe  administered rate on SS and
:PF funds. Following  Bhalla’s  conjecture
(Figure-4).   we assume that the government
ire-empu  this from the supply of time
deposits...  .’  (.  ’
The resulting equilibrium in terms of
nominal and real interest rates is given in
Figun 5. As before the DL and DT cur&
relate to the demand for time deposits and
loans with respect to real interest rates,
whereas theDL’nnd DTcurves  which are
shifted by the relevant inflation rates pw
(the WPI  inflation rate) and pc  (the CPI
inflation rate) respectively. With a nomi-
nal non- primary fiscal deficit of ‘ed’,  the
market clearing interest rate would be  i*.
OR’ of demand deposits are created, of’
which PR’  would be used to fund the
deficit ‘ed’, and OL’ would be given as
loans to the private sector. This equilib-
rium would imply that for the given p and
pw (and hence shifts in the DL and DT
curves) the real interest rates on deposits
would be rd’ and that on loans rl’.
The DT’ curve was estimated from  a
least squares regression of the form:
log (TD) =  co  +  cl  * IDBIPLR
-  cq   *  INFCPI +  c3   *
where
log-(GDPNOM) (R-l)
TD are time deposits of the banking sector
IDBIPLR is the IDBI minimum lending rate
INFCPI is the CPI inflation rate
GDPNOM is nominal GDP
We used the IDBI minimum lending rate
as our nominal interest rate variable (i)  asthe   SS  and   PIT  nominal  talcs   hnvc   been
constant for most 0C llic period  and only
changed  insmall  jumps. But  3s most intcrcst
mtcs arc highly  corrch~tcd  in India [NCAER
2000]. and on  the   Bhnlln   conjecture
the SS and PF fund  rates   influence   the  real
rates  charged  in the rest  of the money
market,  the IDBI minimum lending rate
which shows  considerable variation
would be a statistical proxy for our desired
nominal intcrcst rate  i.
The estimated regression equation for
demand for time deposits is as  follows.6




+ 1.2687  *  log (GDPNOM)
(22.24)***
RZ = 0.9858
DW Statistic = 0.4529
Sample: 1971-72 to 1998-99
The  coefficients have the right sign and
except for the CPI inflation rate are
statistically significant.
For the DL’ function we estimated the
Ieast  squares regression:
Xog (SCBNFC)  =  ‘a,,  - a,  *  IDBIPLR
+;L2*INFwP1
t aj  + log(GDPMFGN)
(R-11)
where
SCBNFC is scheduled commercial banks’
non-food credit
INFWPI  is the WPI inflation rate
GDPMFGN is nominal manufacturing
output.
As food credit is determined by a num-
ber of non-economic factors, we would
expect the demand for non-food credit to
be more responsive to the economic forces
of real interest rates. Moreover as most of
the non-food credit demand is likely to be
from the manufacturing sector, we take its
output level as a measure of Y. The esti-
mated regression model for demand for
credit is as  follows:







DW Statistic = 2.02
Sample: 1986-87 to 1998-99
Though the coeffitients  are of the right
sign they are not statistically significant
except for the output variable, even though
the overall regression is highly significant,
So, faute de mieux. we will be using the
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estimated coefficients in our exercises on
the ‘financial exuberance’ model.. *
Given these  estimates  of the DT  atid  DL
schedules we  fir&,  determined what would
be the equilibrium  inte,reat   rateif  them  was
no fiscal deficit and hence no need for any
government borrowing (including any need
for bank reserves ‘which  also  represent
government borrowing) which is the nomi-
nal interest rate i* in Figure 5. This is done
by equating IogO)  = log (SCBNFC) in
the estimated regression models R-I and
R-II and solving for the IDBIPLR which
would equate the demand and supply for
loannblefunds,giventheCPIandWPI  infla-
tion .rates  and nominal GDP and man&
facturing  output in each  year.  These esti-
mates are given in Table 1 (part A. row 1).
We next estimated how  much higher the
interest rate would have to be, given the
non-primary deficit, which is financed by
borrowing, that is  iA  in Figure 5. We need
to determine the change in the interest rate
from  the equilibrium level  i* for the given
non-primary deficit B. This can be derived
from R-I and R-II, for any given year that
the shift  variables.  INFCPI, INFWPI and
‘log  (GDPNGM)  and log (GDPMNFG) are
constant. Then the total supply of  loanable
funds available for private  sector  loans
with. the deficit B will be SL=TD-B.
Then,  from R-I,
log (TD) = CO + cl.PLR
SL = e  Co  +c’.PLR  -B . . . . (R-Ia)
The demand for loanablc  funds from
R-H  (with inflation and output constant for
a given year) will be,
Iog(SCB)   = a0 -. al.PLR
so,  ’
SCB  = e ao  -  r!.PLR  . ..(R-IIa)
Equating R-Ia and R-Ha.  we get, ’
e  ‘kO+cl.PLR   -B  =  e  rtil.PLR.   -  ’
denoting (CO  +clPLR)  = x, and ’
(a&al PLR)‘=  y, we get
-dB  =  -cl.e*  .dPLR + al  ey   .dPLR,
so,
dPLR  =  dB/[cleX  +  aley  ]...(A)
From (A) we can calculate the change in .
interest rate; dPLR, implied by the non-
-primary deficit financed by borrowing,
given our estimates of the coefficients  CO,
cl, a0 and al from R-I and R-II.’ These
estimates are given in Table 1 (Part B,
row 1). The non-primary deficit financed
by borrowing is computed as total non-
primary deficit (gross fiscal deficit
less primary deficit) less the amount of
deficit financed by small savings schemes.
This is because small savings funds used
for financing the deficit are not appro-
priated from time deposits of commercial
banks.
Next, we estimated the inflation rate,
which  according to the monetarist model
is given by the primary deficit financed by
expanding base money. The estimated
money demand function is of the form,
logO=b,+   bt*   IogCy/P)-b,*  log(P) (R-III) -
where
M is reserve money
Y/p  is real GDP
P is the GDP deflatorDW  Statistic = 0.69
Sample:  1970-71  to  1999-99
Both cocfficicnts  WC  of the  right sign
and   sta.tistically  significant. This implies,
dM,%l   = b 1.  d(YIP)/(YIP)  +  bZ.dP/P
denoting dM/M  = m. and using




p I: (m-blg)/b2 . ..(R-1114
As  in the monetarist model, expanding
merve  money finances the primary deficit
m  =dMfM  =DIM,
Substituting this in  R-IIIa  gives us the
predicted inflation rate for  various  years
shown in Table 1 (Part C).
v‘
Policy  .Analysis
Figures 6 and 7 chart the actual and
predicted  nominal interest rates,  and the
actual,  and predicted GDP deflatqr.  The
predicted rates are derived based on the
hypothesis that the government is  implic-
5   itly following the monetarist model .by
financing the  corqolidated  primary deficit
by increasing base money (and hence
through the inflation tax) and the non-
primary deficit by rolling over the interest
on debt.
Flgurc  6: Nominal intcrcst  Rata  (Per Cent)  with Bond-Financed Non-Prlmary  Defklt
- .
71 .  . ???? ?
1990.91 1991-92 1992.93 1993-94  1994-95 1995-96 1996-97  1997.96 1998.99 1999.00 2000-01
- - - Predicted  Rate - Actual Rate
‘Figure 7: GDP-Deflator (Per Cent Change) under Slmulatlon of Bond-Financed
Non-Primary Dellclt
30 --_- -
25  \ !1
04
1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 1993.94 1994.95 1995.96   1996.97   1997-98   1996.99.1999-00
-  - -  Pfediiedlnllation - Actual  Inflation
Figure 8: Nomlnal Interest Rate (Per Cent) wlth Actual lnflatlon Rate Used to
Compute Monetl8ed Deflclt and Bond-Flnanclng  df Non-Prin?afy OeflClt
.
16  -
“’ 16  - ,,
14  -
?
12  - -  I mm
- -5
- 10  - -,m  m -m  - !
-m  - -.  -
.s+ -e. 1
1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94   1994-95 1995.96   199647   1997.98 +3-99 199940 2000-01
- - - PraWsdRate - ActualRate
Table 1: Results of Altematlve Slmulatlons of the Monetarlat Model
1990-91   1991-92   ‘992-93   199394  1994-95   1995.96   1996.97   1997-96   1996.99  1999-w  2OOo-01
A  NO  Public sector borrowing and  market  equilibrium
Equilibrium nominal interest rate (per cent) 10.663 9.412  8.873  7.736 8.130 6.341 7.296 6.034  5.038  3.832 2.960
Eiaslicily  of demand  for  loans -0.108 -0.095  -0.088  -0.078  4.062  -0.084   -0.074  -0.061 -0.051  a.039 -0.030
Elasticity of demand  tar   depsite 0.624 0.550 0.507 0.452 0.475 0.407 0.426 0.352 0.294 0.224 0.174
Inflation-  cpijw(per  cent) 11.561 13.472 9.569  7.500  10.078 10.211 9.265 7.016  t3.115  3.362  3.800
Inflation-wpi-all (per cent) 10.260 13.736 10.056 6.352 12.500 6.069 4.605 4.403 5.944 3.269 7.113
Real  interest  rate: deposits (Per cent) -0.8i7  -4.059  -0.916 0.236  -1.948  -1.671  ’  -1.969   -0.983   -&oT/  0.450 -0.820
Real.interest  rate: credit  (per   cen0 0.424  -4.326  -1.34  -0.615 -4.370 0.252 2.691 1.632 -0.906 0.563 -4.133
8 With public  SeCtOr  borrowing
Non-primary  fisoal  deficit  WithOUt  SInal\  SaVingS   (RS  CrOrS) 16779  26721  33340   37340  40135  52086  62146 60700 63109 61716 101299
Rise in interest  rate  to finance  non-primary
fiscal deficit (per cent) 2.046 2.965. 3.189 3.075 2.691 2.637 2.964 2.664 2.509  2.864  3.287
Nominal interest rate  if  non-primary deficit is financed
by borrowing (per Cent) 12.730 12.378 11.862  lo.812  10.621   ll.ln  10.261  6.698 7.546 6.716 6.267
Actual  IDBI  PLR (per  Cent) 14.5 19  la  16 15 17.5 16.2  13.3 13.5  15.35 13.2
.C  fnflation  rate under public sector borrowing to finance non-primary fiscal  deficit
Predicted  gdpdellator  inflation (per Cent) 25.162 12.374 0.727  11.806  5.730  3.444 2.642 9.462 17.343 14.120 7.890
Ac!ual  gdpdeflator iflltation (per  cent) 10.409 13.633 9.146 9.636 9.371 0.764 7.033 6.543 9.261 3.614 5.055
IJ   Special  cases  of monetisation  of non-Fx%-na~  fiscal deticit
Nominal interest rate with actual inflation rate  (0 obtain
monetised deficit (per cent) 14.660  12.190   11.602  11.146 10.264  10.416   9.6’9  9.089  8.666 8.090 6.642 .
fnflatin assuming the entire fiscal deficit is
monetised (per cent) 50.663   40.361  36.403  39.933   33.5~1   zag22  34.414 40.656  4g.m  50.317 46.020
E Crowding out of private investment (as a per cent of loans)
At predicted nominal interest rate under Scenario B above 2.072  3.003   3.229  3.115 2.725 2.673  3.002  2.698. 2.541 2.921 3.3207
Al actual nominal interest rate 3.665   9.7’0  9.446  8.369 6.958  g.277  9.016 7.359 6.571 11.665  lK%tryronl   Fi;:u:c   6.  iI  i‘:ll:   IV  WC’II   111:11   :llc
;IC~LI;I~ n0rllirl;ll  inlcrc~l  r;liC  Il~lSiXcIl ilighcr
by  over  5   pcrccnl:I~c   p01nIs   tlliln  hc  rnlc
prcxlictcd   10  lin:ltlcc  llw ml-primry dcli-
cit. Tllc trends in  tllc ;IC~U:I\  :md prcdictcd
rnlcs ;irc lhc s;liw2.  This  is  10  bc  CXpCClCd
JS  on  the   Bhalla  conjcclurc,  Ihc  nominal
inlcrcst   rate is lid   10   lb2   SS Wd   PI:
~JminislcrcdrntcsanJll;ls~~n~~  bccnslowly
adjusted. So hc is right  1lW  II the  nominal
imcrcst   r:W   wcrc   mXkc1 dclcrmincd il
WOUILI  bc  about J-5  perccntagc points iowcr
th,ln   the  administered  MC I O bond-finance
the   given non-primary dclicit in any ycar.ll
High nominal  in!ercst  rates have  dis-
tortedcreditalloca!ionwithin  theeconomy
in two ways. First. investment in govern-
ment debt by banks has been considerably
higher than the mandated Statutory Li-
quidity Ratio (SLR),  Icading fo  a reduction
in the availability of bank credit to the
privtitc  sector.9  Second. high lending rates
reduce corporate  demand  for credit, fur-
ther pushing bank funds into government.
securities.
From Figure 7. it appears  that the pre-
dicted rate both over- and under-estimates
the inflation rate  ,in   vnrious   years.  This
implies that the government is not strictly
fc~lio\vilr;  Ihc  nh)ncI:IrlFI  prcscriprion.   ;mCl
III  ycarc   \vl:cn  llic  prctliclcd   r;uc is  ;lbc)~,c
hi   ac~u;rl   rds  il is  lin:incing   p;lrt  of  rhc
prim;iry   dciicit   alsO   hy  horrcnving,   and  in
years  whcrc  it is  bclOw  lllc  actual   r;ltc  it
has  been  moncIising   p:lrt  ol’  Ihc  non-pri-
Inary  &licit.  It  seems  to hnvc  been   follow-
ing an  implicil  inflation  Inrgcl  (which is
linked  IO   IIIC  growth ofbasc  money).  Thus,
thcrc is  a   const;mt downward  trend in  the
actual inllation  mtc bctwccn  1902   ;~nd
1997.  with  ;1   blip in  l9OS-99,  Iargcly  due
to  large capital flows which  wcrc  not
stcrilised  and  hence meant a  rise in base
money  above  the previous  trend.”
Since it is apparent that  the   entire  pri-
mary deficit is not strictly  .finnnced  by
monetisntion each year, we also conducted
another exercise. A S the actual inflation
rate is determined by  the  growth of base
money which is  determined  partly by  the
gross deficit financed by money creation
(the other part by  changes in  foicx   rc-
serves), we can determine for each  year
what part of the gross deficit must then
be financed by bond financing. This then
allows us  to  determine the predicted nomi-
nal interest rate for the  estimqted  bond
financing. Results of this exercise are
5110\V.11   111   ‘l‘.ll~lC  I.  l’;lrt I).  ,\s  Illc  ;~ilu.:l
:Inil   prciliclc~!  inll:~Iloii   r;itcs  III  11115  cscr-
cisc   arc 1hc same.   wc only cJi:lrI   llic ;iCl~i;ll
2nd  prcdiclcti  ncmiin3l  intcrcsf  r:itcs in Fig-
urc  X.  Thcrc  is  1101   much  dil’l’crcncc in the
pallcrii  ol’   prcdiclcd   :wcl  3ctu;ll   inlcrcst
rates in  Figure   8  as  compared with  Fig-
urc 6. Hcncc. it seems Ill;\1  Ihc assumpIions
of  IIIC   monetarist   model  about bond  li-
mincing  :irc  lurgcly valid.
Nsxl.   WC   considcrcd   what would  hc  Ihc
inllalion   rate  if  rhc  whole of  Ihc gross
dclicit had  been  financed Ihrough incrcnscs
in  base   mcucy,  and thus  the   inllation 1:1x.
The results  are given in Part D ofTnhlc  1.
The required inllation rates arc much higher
than  those  assumed by  Joshi and Little
(1996)  as the inflation  r;1tcs  which would
result from  safe  scignonge.  In  itn   inlln-
tion-shy economy such monetary accom-
modation of the  dcti’cit would be politi-
cally  disastious.  and with the  danger  ot
slipping into hyper-inflationalsocconomi-
tally.  The govcmmcnt has  been  right,
therefore.  to target the inflation rate by
keeping the growth of reserve money  IO
roughly yield an inflation rate of around
8-10 per cent, whilst financing  the rest of
the fiscal deficit through bond financing.
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CLOSING DATE OF  Ai’PLICXTION:  3 November 3001I)uf  If ()II~ CS~I~:IICS  .II'C  ri$t.  ~hc gw-
C~IIIIICI~(   Ius   p.~id  n  much  hlghcf   intcrcst
r:l[c   tll;ln  it  rv.xdcd it  It)   1WXllSc   0f   the
;~tIlninis[crcd   inlcrcsl   r:W   rcsimc.   3lld
Bh;lll3  is right 11131  in  3  ni:lrkcrdctcrmincd
in[crcs[   r:Uc   rcgimc   lhc   inlcrcst   rm  lrrd
hcncc   the interest  coniponcnl   Of  1hC  fiscal
d&kit would have  been   smaller.
But hc is wrong to sug$~t thnt  the fiscal
clcticit  does not  matter  or that the interest
rntcs  3rc determining the fi~c3l  deficit. As
the monetarist  modci   cncompasscs   the
model of  tinanci3l   exuber3nce   incorpor3t-
ing his conjecture. and  seems  applicable
tb India. it is clear that monedsing the
primary deficit will  -  3s it seems to have
‘in pnctice  - determine the inflation  r3te.
Moreover. from the condition for the
sustain3bility  of bond fin3ncing  (equa-
tion 5) it is clear that with the economy
currently growing at about 6 per cent per
annum, real interest  r3tcs  ?bove  thnt will
only lead to 3 sust3inable  debt-income
ratio if the government mns  3 long run
primary surplus.
Even if sustainable. any fiscal deficit  (3s
well  3s non-investment public expendi-
ture) involves crowding out of private
investment. We have estimated by how
much investment has been crowded  oi.11
from the level without 3ny  fis~31  deficit
(3j  in Figure 5). I1 These estimates of
crowding out are given in Part E of Table 1.
There are two sets of reported estimates.
One is for the crowding out which must
necessarily occur if borrowing funds the
non-primary deficit. These estimates are
based on our estimated changes in interest
rites.   di’  s.  for each year. But  3s  the actual
interest rate has been higher thnn  this
estimated market clearing rate, we have
ulso  estimated the crowding out from the
3ctual  interest ntes. The difference be-
tween them provides 3n  estim3te  of the
extra crowding out resulting from the
3dminisrered  interest rnte regime. This
difference. 3s well 3s the necessary crowd-
ing out from public borrowing is not large.
mainly because our estimated interest
elasticity for the demand for loans is fairly
low. To that extent. replacing the admin-
istered by 3 market based interest rate
@me would  increase   the  investment  -
GDP ratio by about l/Z to 34 per cent.
Even with no borrowing. the investment
ratio   would rise by  just over 1 per cent.
So the great boost to growth postulated by
Bhalfa  from the change in the interest rate
regime also seems insecure. Nevertheless,
cutting unproductive public expenditure
remains imperative, both to turn the  pri-
Wry   clcliclt   11110   :I  surplus  3s  well  ;IS  to
prcvrnt   the  large  squandering  of domestic
rnvings  in vnrious  forms  of predatory rent
seeking  by  rhc   stntc.
Finally.  the most important  mc3surc  to
bring down intcrcst  rates  in  the economy
is to open  lhc   capital  3ccounl  with 3 float-
ing exchange  r3tc.  There,  thus,  rcm3ins  3
subst3mial  amount of  unfinished   business
if Indi3’s  fin3nciA  sector  is to be bccomc
the efficient engine of intermediation it
ought  lo  become.UXl
Notes
I And by implication  inlucst  rates on other debt
instruments would  also   decline significantly.
2 The new classical view can be found in Sargent
and Wallace, and the Wickscllian view in
Bombcrger and Makinen.
3 WC assume that rcscr~c  rrquircmcnts  would
not be needed in the  ‘no  deficit’ cast.
4 ce  differentiation is indicated by the standard
notations of  (dxldt)  or x’. .
5 Changes in forcx  reserves also affect but
monei.  We ignore thii aspect in the current
analysis as it is not critical to the  nrgumcnts
h&e.
6  Thct-mtiosofestimatcdngrcssioncocfficients
are given in parentheses below the  rcspcctivc
coefficients. The significance is  indicated  by
?? ????? ???? ??? ** for 10 per cent.  5 per cent  rmd
1   per cent  level of probability. The  same
notation is fol\owcd  in the cttsc  of the  other
estimated equations  as  well.
7  Wecanalsodetermine  thcchasticityofdemand
for loans  (CL)   and   deposits   (CD)   at   the
equilibrium interest rate  without any  fiscal
deficit  (i*) for each  ycttr   as  follows. From R-l
and  R-II if the quantity of equilibrium  lo;ms/
deposits at point a in Figure V is  q, and the
equilibrium PLR is denoted by  i*. and  as  in
any year the  inflation  and output  vlrrirbles   YC
constanl  then:
fmm  R-I.
log q = c0  + cl.i*  . . . A.1
and  from   R-t1
log q  = a0 -al. i* . . . A.2
Differentiating,
dlogq  = dq/q = cl.di . . . A.11
=  -al.di  . . . A.2a
HClllX.
CD = @q/q).  (i*/di) =  cl.?  . . . . A.lb
CL = (dq/q).  (i*ldi)  = -al.i* . . . . A.lc
Thus, for 1998. the  estimated  i* in Table  1
is 5.038. and from estimated eouations the
values of the interest rate  coeffi&nts  are.
cl  =0.058   and al  = -0.01.
The estimated elasticities arc.
CD=  0.29:  CL=  0.05
Thus, both cures are relatively inelastic with
the demand curve for  deposits  being  more
elastic than that for loans.
g  Ofcourse.thedeviationoftheprcdictcdinrcrest
rate from  the actual can  also  be due to  the
inadequate fit of the model. However.
indications of investments  hy the banks  in
cxczss  of statutory  rcquircmcnts at rates lower
than  WLR  suggests   that  the floor for
commercial lending holds up  mtes  for the
private sector but not for the government. If
the interest  r3tcs  were to be  Ilrxiblc  downward
for everyone. they would  bc lower  than the
administered level.
prcscrlhcd  SLR  of  25  pr  ten<
IO  The hirbcr  inllation  rntc  was also  WI  nccounl
of  supply  shocks: Onion  prices  shot  up  ;K the
crop was  affcclcd  by poor rainfall.
I I Given  the  cstimnlc  of CL in any year.  WC can
derive  thccxtcntofcrowdingout(aj  in Rgurc  5)
3s follows:
As  CL=   (dq/q)(i*/di).  and as  the pcrcenk~gc
change  in  the   demand  for loans (crowding out)
! is  dqlq.  we have:
dq/q=  cL.dili  *
Thus, for example. In 1998-99.  cL=O.O5.
di  =  4.528.  i* = 5.038. Substituting  thcsc  in
the  above  gives   dq/q  of 5 per cent. which as
a ratio of GDP. is  1.15   per  cent. as  the
investment-GDP ratio in the year was 23  per
cent.  Similarly based  on the actual intcrcst
rates. di = 8.46,  the   dq/q  for  <he actual rate
was   8.3   per  cent. So the  administered  interest
rate  regime  Icads  to an extra crowding out  of
investment of 1.9-I.  IS= 0.75  per  cent of GDP.
References
Bhalla.  S  (2tlC0):  ‘Finmcirl Sector Policies in
India  -  Apne Pttir  PC  Apni  Kuilhdi’.  mimco.
Oxus  Fund M;mrgcmcnt.  New Delhi.
- (1999):  ‘Httyek Rcdiscovcrcd the  Road  to
E.conomicFrcedom’.p;lpcrprexntcdatMitsui
Life  Finttncial   Cctttrc  Conference on ‘Econo-
mic  Ft&om  and  Dcveiomncnt’.Tokyo.  June.
- (1995): ‘This Time  ft Is Aircttdy  Diff&ent - A
Personal Perspective’, Dcutschc Bank.
December 7.  -
Bombcrger. W A and C E  Makiticn  (1980):
‘Indexntion.   Infltttionary   Finttnce  and
Hypcrinflation: The 1945-1946 Hungarian
Experience’,  Journal  of  Polirical  Economy.
JUtlC.
Joshi.  V and 1  MD Littlc( 1996):/ndia’.rEconnmic
Refonnc   1991-2001. Oxford University Press.
N;w  Delhi.
Lal.  D (1995):  !Notes on Money, Debt and
Altem~Gve Monetary Regimes for Brazil’.
Revisra  de Economio  Polirico.  Vol IS.  No 60.
October-December, pp 99-I I 1.
Mckinnon, R (1981): ‘Financial Repression and
the Libcralisation Problem within  Lsss
Developed  Countries’ in S  Grassman  and
E Lundberg (eds):  7%~  World Economic  Order
-  Parr and  Prosprcrs.   Macmilkm. London.
Mohan.  R (2000):  ‘FiscalCorrection  for Economic
Growth: Data Analysis and Suggestions’.
Economic  and Poliricul   Weeklr.   Voi 35. .
No 24, pp 2027-36.
NCAER  (2000):  ModeNinn  of Finunciul   Sec~oc
E.&II~c kore and lnre>e.ir Rates in rhe Indian
Economy, New Delhi.
Oxus  Research and  lnvestmcnts   (2000):
Developing Trench. Vol 4. Nos I and 2. Oxus
Research and Investment. February 24.
Patnaik.  P  (2ooO):  ‘On Some Common  ivlacro-
economic Fallacies’, Ecomwric  und Poliricuf
Weekly.   Vol 35. No  IS. April 8. pp  1220-22
- ~1-001~:  ‘On Fiscal Deficits and Real Interest
Rates’.  Econumic   und  Polilical Weekly.
Vol36.  Nos I4 and 15. April 14.  pp 1160-63.
Sargent. T J (1986):  Rorionol  Erpec~urions and
In/larion,  Harper and Row.  .New York.
Sargent. T J and N Wallace (1981): ‘Some
Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic’.  Federal
Rerrrvc  Bunk  o/ Mintleopolis  Quarrrrl!
Rer*iew.   July. reprinted in Sargent  (1986).